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Abstract 
This paper discusses the role of sector-specific ministries as development cooperation 
providers. These actors have the potential to contribute assets such as funding, expertise, 
or access to networks for global development efforts. However they may also present 
challenges for development bureaucracies by advancing alternative priorities or by com-
plicating coordination efforts at headquarters and partner-country levels. The paper situ-
ates the analysis of donor bureaucracies in current discussions on aid and development 
effectiveness and the transformation of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) poli-
cy field and outlines questions to guide future research on this topic. 
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Introduction 
The diversification in the nature of the actors providing funding for development is one 
key element of the evolving development cooperation landscape. Interest in so-called 
‘new’ actors in international development has been directed especially at aid providers 
beyond the membership of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 
whether emerging economies or private aid providers. The increasing importance of these 
new actors was a stimulus for negotiating the Global Partnership for Effective Develop-
ment Cooperation, a framework that acknowledges the value of the diverse experiences 
that actors can contribute to global development efforts. Within this framework, OECD-
DAC donor commitments to align funding to partner-country priorities, harmonize assis-
tance with investments from other donors, and improve the results orientation of aid re-
main at the core of the aid and development effectiveness agenda. 
Even as OECD-DAC donors seek to enlarge the network of aid providers committed to 
aid effectiveness principles, they continue to face significant challenges in implementing 
these principles on their own. Donor coordination remains difficult in many contexts given 
the persistence of various national and institutional interests, and bilateral cooperation 
continues to be privileged over multilateral cooperation.1 Although the appeal for greater 
harmonization suggests that coordination challenges primarily result from limited concer-
tation between the states that make up the OECD-DAC donor community, coordination 
deficits may also persist due to the fragmented character of development policymaking 
within individual donor countries.  
This paper explores the issue of bureaucratic pluralism within donor countries and dis-
cusses its implications for the future of development cooperation. While the distribution of 
authority in global development across diverse governmental entities has a long tradition 
in many donor countries, the expansion of the global development agenda creates an open-
ing for ministries with expertise in specific sectors to assume greater importance in rela-
tion to the development agencies that have been the guardians of a development agenda 
dominated by the Millennium Development Goals and Paris Declaration principles of aid 
effectiveness. The involvement of diverse players within OECD-DAC countries in devel-
opment policymaking may present an advantage in terms of mobilizing knowledge and 
building new partnerships or networks to support development goals or a disadvantage in 
adding competing goals and implementation channels for development funding.2 
                                                            
1 In 2012, DAC donors provided roughly 71 per cent of their ODA through bilateral channels and 29 per 
cent through multilateral channels (OECD 2013b).  
2 Because development is a multidimensional process and the interests of the large variety of actors 
contributing to development are diverse, the term ‘development goals’ can be considered a placeholder 
for numerous objectives such as sustainable economic growth, poverty reduction, or good governance. 
An assumption underlying this paper is that these goals identified with development cooperation as a pol-
icy field will remain relevant as a guide for international engagement in the future. However, these goals 
should not only be considered reference points in the narrowly defined policy field of development coop-
eration, but also across domestic and international public policy arenas. A key challenge for governments 
in the future will be to determine how to reconcile development goals with other policy objectives, both in 
terms of setting priorities and organizing external action to promote them effectively.  
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With a view to outlining a research agenda on the role of donor bureaucracies in the trans-
formation of development cooperation, this paper proceeds as follows.3 It first presents an 
overview of the division of bureaucratic responsibilities for development cooperation 
across the OECD-DAC donor community. In a second step, the paper discusses the impli-
cations of bureaucratic diversity for the implementation of the aid and development effec-
tiveness agenda. A third chapter discusses how the topic of bureaucratic pluralism relates 
to the transformation of development cooperation as a policy field. The paper concludes 
by identifying questions for further research.  
1 Line ministries in development cooperation: patterns across the OECD-
DAC community 
Reflecting the diversity of systems of political organization and differences in the priori-
ties of development assistance even within the OECD-DAC community, there are varia-
tions in this donor club in how development policy competencies are divided among gov-
ernmental actors. In some cases, the division of bureaucratic responsibilities reflects his-
torical legacies where development cooperation emerged from a pre-existing multidimen-
sional relationship between colonial powers and governed territories. For example, the 
central role that the French Ministry of Finance has played in France’s development coop-
eration system stemmed from its importance in managing economic relations and mone-
tary cooperation with former French colonies (Lundsgaarde 2013). In Portugal, sixteen 
ministries were involved in administering development cooperation in 2010, highlighting 
the mixed character of development goals and the historical importance of sectoral spe-
cialization in relations with lusophone countries (OECD 2010c). In other cases, the divi-
sion of development policy competencies across diverse line ministries follows the logic 
of functional separation, where ministries are charged with managing elements of coopera-
tion that lie in their areas of expertise. As an example, the Swiss State Secretariat of Eco-
nomic Affairs (SECO), part of the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education 
and Research, holds responsibility for Swiss development cooperation instruments related 
to macroeconomic policy and trade and investment promotion due to its core competen-
cies in the field of economic policy (Lundsgaarde 2013). 
The OECD-DAC’s analytical work provides a starting point for assessing the organiza-
tional set-up of donor aid programmes from a comparative perspective. For many DAC 
donors, aid management still takes place within a concentrated bureaucratic landscape. In 
concentrated aid management systems, the organization of development cooperation gen-
                                                            
3 The terms ‘development policy’ and ‘development cooperation’ generally refer to a policy field concerned 
with the promotion of the social and economic development of countries classified as ‘developing’ based 
on national income levels, with development cooperation relating more directly to the concrete measures 
that are implemented in partner countries (transfers of expertise or financial resources) to foster develop-
ment goals. As Ashoff and Klingebiel (forthcoming) note, development policy has a broader connotation 
that includes efforts to shape global regulatory frameworks to support development goals and to improve 
the coherence of policies within donor countries that have an impact on developing countries. Given the 
broad nature of development goals, there has long been an overlap between development policy and other 
externally-oriented policy fields. The transformation of development cooperation does not only refer to 
the changing actor landscape, the reconsideration of development goals, or innovations in development 
cooperation instruments, but also to reflection on the distinct contribution of development cooperation 
alongside other dimensions of engagement with developing countries.  
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erally centres on the donor’s ministry of foreign affairs and a bureaucracy responsible for 
aid implementation. The OECD-DAC has identified four generalized models of aid man-
agement that highlight variations in the role of the foreign affairs ministry in development 
cooperation (OECD 2009c): 
1) Development cooperation is fully integrated into the ministry of foreign affairs (exam-
ples are Denmark and Norway). 
2) Development cooperation is designed and implemented by a specialized directorate or 
agency directly under the aegis of the ministry of foreign affairs (Finland, Ireland, Ita-
ly, the Netherlands, and Switzerland are among the examples). 
3) Responsibility for development cooperation is divided between a (foreign affairs) min-
istry responsible for policy guidance and a development agency responsible for im-
plementation (France and Sweden are considered examples).4 
4) An independent ministry separate from the ministry of foreign affairs designs and im-
plements development cooperation programmes (United Kingdom).  
While these variations to some extent reflect the specificities of the political systems in 
which development cooperation as a policy field is embedded, the way that authority is 
distributed within and across bureaucracies can vary over time, responding to short-term 
political changes and external challenges. 
Alongside these variations in organizational set-up, there are also variations in the extent 
of financing overseen by foreign affairs or development ministries. Donors which consoli-
date the design and implementation of Official Development Assistance (ODA) pro-
grammes are considered to have an advantage in pursuing coherent action and raising the 
profile of the development cooperation programme. For this reason, the OECD-DAC has 
often encouraged bilateral donors to rationalize aid administrations by placing all devel-
opment-oriented work across government departments under a common strategic umbrella 
and increasing the coherence of country-level oversight of aid programmes (OECD 
2009c). Reflecting broader efforts to rationalize Dutch public administration, the DAC 
peer review of the Netherlands indicated that an average of 87 per cent of Dutch ODA was 
overseen by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 2006 and 2011 (OECD 2011a). This 
figure is comparable to the amount of ODA administered by the United Kingdom’s De-
partment for International Development (DFID), considered a powerful global develop-
ment player capable of influencing policy toward developing countries across government 
departments due to the agency’s independent status and cabinet-level rank (OECD 2010d). 
As the British and Dutch cases suggest, consolidation or dispersion in development fund-
ing is not necessarily directly linked to the overall size of aid budgets. Birdsall and Kharas 
(2010) identify Greece as the DAC donor with the most fragmented aid system, even 
though it is among the smallest donors both in terms of aid volume and the percentage of 
national income directed to ODA.  
                                                            
4 In the Managing Aid study, the German development cooperation system is also assigned to this category, 
as the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), an independent de-
velopment ministry, is responsible for policy guidance and oversight of the development cooperation sys-
tem, while assistance is implemented through a variety of other organisations, of which the Gesellschaft 
für internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the KfW Development Bank are the most important.  
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Table 1: Key development bureaucracies in leading DAC donor countries 
France The Agence Française de Développement (AFD) is the primary operational 
agency, managing 66 per cent of French bilateral ODA in 2008. Its work is 
overseen by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, 
which also manage important shares of the ODA budget on their own 
(OECD 2008b) 
Germany The last DAC peer review reported that the Federal Ministry of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ), a ministry with cabinet-level status, 
oversaw 54 per cent of the ODA budget. The Ministry of Finance was sec-
ond in importance, overseeing 20 per cent of ODA flows due to its role in 
managing contributions to the EU budget and debt relief (OECD 2010a).  
Japan Following reforms implemented in 2008, responsibility for implementing 
ODA has been consolidated in the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA), with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs retaining an important role in 
providing policy guidance. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and JICA to-
gether oversaw two-thirds of Japanese ODA at the time of the last DAC 
peer review (OECD 2010b). 
The Netherlands The management of development cooperation has been fully integrated into 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which not only assumes responsibility for 
oversight of the large majority of ODA resources (87 per cent on average 
between 2006 and 2010), but also has a coordinating role for resources 
beyond its direct control (OECD 2011a). 
United Kingdom The cabinet-level Department for International Development (DFID) bears 
responsibility for development policy guidance and implementation and 
manages the vast majority of ODA resources (86 per cent in 2010) (OECD 
2010d).  
United States The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) man-
aged just over half of US foreign assistance funding in 2009. Another 17 
per cent was managed directly by the US State Department, which has been 
a focal point for development policy planning, particularly following a 
process of organizational reform in 2006 leading to the consolidation of 
State Department and USAID budget planning (OECD 2011d).  
Source:  Author’s own compilation 
The German development cooperation system appears on the surface to be similar to the 
United Kingdom’s, as a rare case of a donor with an independent, cabinet-level ministry. 
Yet according to the statistics compiled in the DAC peer review process, the Federal Min-
istry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) oversees a more limited share of 
ODA resources, suggesting that differences in the character of ministerial control in man-
aging aid across countries reflect numerous factors. The competencies that development 
ministries possess within the political system in which they are embedded stem not only 
from the formal independence of development policy from other policy portfolios but also 
from the internal structure of these ministries and their role in policy implementation as 
well as the specific instruments they are mandated to oversee. In 2008, the DAC peer re-
view of Germany noted that the BMZ administered only 54 per cent of German ODA, 
with the remainder being overseen by the Finance Ministry, Foreign Office, various line 
ministries, and the development cooperation programmes of the federal states (OECD 
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2010a).5 The limited coordination mandate of the BMZ with respect to the international 
activities of other ministries and the existence of powerful implementing agencies separate 
from the BMZ in the German development cooperation system are considered to diminish 
the ministry’s weight in the development policy system (Brombacher 2009).  
In Canada, the bulk of the development portfolio was historically managed by the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), an independent agency subordinate to the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs. Its importance in ODA administration has declined in recent years, 
with the share of ODA funding managed by the agency declining from 75 per cent to 68 per 
cent between 2007 and 2009 as other government departments have assumed a larger inter-
national role (OECD 2012b). In March 2013, the Canadian government announced that it 
would fold CIDA into the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, a move 
considered to imply a closer alignment of Canadian development policy with foreign policy 
and trade objectives.6 These examples suggest that even in cases where foreign affairs min-
istries or development agencies manage a declining share of ODA, they still continue to 
serve as the main focal point within their respective development cooperation systems. 
Available information on the distribution of financing across bureaucracies in DAC do-
nors remains limited. This is attributable in part to the difficulties that individual donors 
have in reporting such expenditures to the DAC and to the inconsistent manner in which 
information about funding flowing through different ministries is collected.7 As an exam-
ple, Austria lacks a consolidated ODA budget. The dispersion of funding across eight dif-
ferent ministries complicates the assessment of its full aid portfolio (OECD 2009a). Alt-
hough DAC peer reviews provide an overview of the organization and management of 
development cooperation systems, they do this on a periodic basis with individual donor 
studies covering different time periods. There has to date been no systematic assessment 
of the importance of line ministries as aid providers across the DAC community. Hence, 
the perception that the role of sector-specific ministries beyond foreign affairs and devel-
opment ministries is increasing in importance in the global development arena is largely 
based on impressionistic evidence.  
Across the DAC community, a spectrum of line ministries beyond foreign affairs bureaucra-
cies and aid agencies have been involved in administering some elements of development 
cooperation programmes for many years. Finance ministries have often been important due 
to their oversight of contributions to multilateral development banks or involvement in lend-
                                                            
5  In 2011, the BMZ administered 62.3 per cent of German ODA (See http://www.bmz.de/de/ ministeri-
um/zahlen_fakten/Mittelherkunft_der_bi-_und_multilateralen_ODA_2010-2011.pdf). The exclusion of 
German contributions to the EU budget likely leads to an underestimation of the role of the ministry 
within the German development cooperation system, as the funding is ascribed to the Ministry of Fi-
nance though the Foreign Office and the BMZ assume a more important role in overseeing this fund-
ing. This suggests that the distribution of financing across ministries as reported to the OECD-DAC 
may not present a fully accurate picture of the political role that individual ministries play within a giv-
en development cooperation system.  
6  See: http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/2013-budget/Foreign+Affairs+department+take+over+ agen-
cy/8133658/story.html. 
7  Another complication in describing the global development orientation of line ministries is that funding 
classified as ODA may represent only one dimension of the engagement of these ministries in the 
country contexts where ODA is disbursed. Because the identity of line ministries centres on non-ODA 
policies, they may not understand their international work as development-oriented or distinguish in-
ternational work sharply from other elements of their work programmes.  
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ing and debt relief. In Portugal, the Finance Ministry was responsible for 50 per cent of 
ODA between 2006 and 2009 (OECD 2010c), while Spain’s Ministry of Finance and the 
Economy oversaw 28 per cent of Spanish ODA in 2009 (OECD 2011c). Other ministries 
disbursing aid funding include bureaucracies related to agriculture, defence, education, envi-
ronmental protection, health, and migration. With the exception of defence ministries, these 
ministries can be distinguished from foreign affairs and development bureaucracies because 
their mandates are primarily domestic in character. The internationalization of the work of 
such domestically-oriented ministries is not purely a recent phenomenon. Following the end 
of the Cold War, for example, donors faced a transforming international context including 
the appearance of post-communist transition countries as important aid recipients and the 
rising prominence of issues such as environmental protection and migration (Kloke-Lesch 
1998). These developments raised questions about the rationale and organization of devel-
opment cooperation that parallel current discussions concerning the differentiation of partner 
countries and the management of issue linkages.  
The dispersion of bureaucratic responsibilities for development cooperation is not unique to 
DAC donors. For major emerging aid providers including China and India, the multidimen-
sional quality of development cooperation is reflected in a complex landscape of actors en-
gaging in this policy field. In China, the ministries of Commerce, Foreign Affairs, and Fi-
nance play key roles in development policymaking, with some 28 additional agencies taking 
part in governmental coordination processes (Hong 2012). Smaller emerging aid providers 
such as Mexico or South Africa are currently working to define the role of development 
agencies as pivotal actors in managing development funding disbursed abroad (Romero 
2012; Vickers 2012). Because of the traditionally important role that foreign affairs and de-
velopment bureaucracies have played in many donor contexts in guiding and implementing 
development policy, the analysis of the global development role of a diverse set of bureau-
cratic players stimulates reflection on how to define the mandates of diplomatic and devel-
opment actors in a political context where numerous governmental actors have relevant ex-
pertise to contribute to international cooperation within the ODA policy field and beyond.  
2 Line ministries and the aid and development effectiveness agenda 
The examination of the distribution of bureaucratic responsibilities for aid management 
within OECD-DAC donor countries brings into focus several key challenges related to 
the transformation of development cooperation as a policy field. One main challenge 
concerns the aid and development effectiveness agenda and the role of sector-specific 
ministries in sustaining it. On the one hand, bureaucracies may vary in their awareness 
of or adherence to the principles of effective aid delivery outlined in the Paris and Accra 
agendas. On the other hand, the diversity of bureaucratic involvement in development 
cooperation can also affect the prospects for making progress in the realm of policy co-
herence for development.  
2.1 Bureaucratic pluralism and the aid effectiveness agenda 
The ODA policy field has reached a level of maturity. DAC donors have learned from 
decades of experience in aid provision and have together with partner countries identified 
principles to make development assistance more effective. In a series of international 
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agreements in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), and Accra (2008), donors and partner countries 
committed to improving aid management by applying these aid effectiveness principles. 
Commitments to increase the responsiveness of development policy to nationally-
determined priorities and to improve the extent of donor coordination represent central 
elements of this agenda.  
The commitment to increase national ownership of development cooperation implies that 
partner countries are responsible for devising national strategies that outline development 
priorities and for developing country-level management systems to support the implemen-
tation of these strategies. At the same time, national ownership implies that donors are 
responsible for aligning their investments with these strategies and relying on partner-
country systems as the preferred channel for implementing their assistance (OECD 
2005/2008). While both partner countries and donors have advanced in terms of fostering 
greater national ownership, donors are considered to lag farther behind in fulfilling their 
commitments in this area (Wood et al. 2011).  
Increasing national ownership in development cooperation creates a need for a process 
of reconciling donor and partner-country interests. As Martens (2008) suggests, aid 
agencies can be understood as actors that play a mediating role between the interests of 
partner countries and the interests of individual donors.8 Within donor countries, they 
may be considered the actors that defend the interests of partner countries and support 
the promotion of development goals against a host of other national interests, such as 
diplomatic or commercial objectives (Faust / Messner 2012). In partner countries, aid 
agencies have the responsibility of balancing responsiveness to local development needs 
with their responsibility to oversee the effective use of public resources and to promote 
other national objectives. In contrast, in bureaucracies where development is not the 
primary mandate, designing policy to respond to locally-defined needs in partner coun-
tries is not necessarily self-evident.  
Specialized development bureaucracies can be assumed to be more focused on aid effec-
tiveness tenets as a guide for their work than other bureaucracies involved in aid dis-
bursement. Some evidence supporting this assumption is found in the Quality of ODA 
(QUODA) assessment, which notes in its analysis of the performance of 152 govern-
mental entities disbursing aid that specialized aid agencies are better at fostering institu-
tional development and reducing administrative burdens in recipient countries in com-
parison to other bureaucracies such as foreign affairs and finance ministries. However, 
this analysis also reveals that aid agencies in the aggregate do not have an absolute ad-
vantage over other bureaucracies across all dimensions of aid quality. The QUODA as-
sessment found that specialized aid agencies did not outperform other ministries on 
measures of efficiency, which include indicators related to the poverty and policy selec-
tivity of aid, donor specialization and sectoral concentration, and the level of untied aid 
provided (Birdsall / Kharas 2010).  
                                                            
8  The assumption that aid agencies play a mediating role between donor interests and the interests of 
partner countries implies a degree of neutrality that neglects potential interests that the aid agency or its 
implementing partners defend within a development cooperation relationship. An example is that donor 
agencies may prefer to continue to work in sectors in which they have accumulated expertise rather 
than to exit from particular sectors consistent with partner-country preferences and efforts to promote a 
more efficient division of labour among donors.  
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Although it is possible that these scores reflect the influence of other ministries over aid 
agency performance, for example through their role in shaping aid allocation patterns, 
the result nevertheless suggests that bureaucracies beyond classical aid agencies may 
also operate in a manner consistent with internationally accepted principles of best prac-
tice in aid delivery. Even though poor data availability makes it difficult to judge the 
performance of individual bureaucracies as aid providers, there is evidence of wide vari-
ation among donor agencies with respect to the integration of aid effectiveness princi-
ples in business practice both across different donor countries and between bureaucra-
cies within a single country (Birdsall / Kharas 2010; Easterly / Pfutze 2008). These vari-
ations in performance should introduce caution in accepting development agencies to be 
naturally more capable of promoting international cooperation than other ministries. 
Ministries can bring different strengths to international engagement that may not be cap-
tured in performance criteria derived from development policy discourse alone.  
The promotion of enhanced donor coordination is another important dimension of the 
aid effectiveness agenda, and the analysis of bureaucratic diversity within individual 
donor countries can complement existing approaches to conceptualizing donor coordina-
tion deficits. Limited coordination among donors is considered to be a source of ineffi-
ciency in aid delivery, contributing to the unnecessary duplication of donor analytical 
work, increased administrative burdens on partner governments due to differences in 
funding priorities and reporting requirements, and difficulties in fostering capacity de-
velopment due to competition for qualified staff (Knack / Rahman 2007). In spite of 
international commitments to enhance coordination, the donor landscape continues to be 
fragmented.  
Donor fragmentation can refer both to the dispersion of aid resources across partner coun-
tries and the dispersion or concentration of resources within particular sectors or regions at 
the country level (OECD 2011b). According to OECD estimates, roughly 40 per cent of 
aid relationships could be classified as ‘non-significant’ in 2009, reflecting the large num-
ber of donors providing funding on a relatively small scale across many partner countries 
(OECD 2011b).9 The Paris agenda indicates that donors should withdraw from certain 
areas and delegate aid management responsibilities to other donors in order to address the 
problem of fragmentation. 
In spite of OECD-DAC donor commitments to reduce the administrative burden on part-
ner countries, the proliferation of aid programmes and projects has been a general trend in 
global development over the last two decades (World Bank 2008). This trend has been 
driven not only by the growing prominence of development assistance providers beyond 
                                                            
9 The OECD considers aid relationships to be significant if either of two criteria is met. The first criteri-
on relates to the donor’s share of aid within a given country compared to the donor’s share of all aid 
provided globally. The second criterion reflects whether a donor is part of a group of donors that col-
lectively provide 90 per cent of aid to a given partner country (OECD 2011b). The first measure, de-
signed to favour small donors, is problematic because it only requires a marginal level of concentration 
in an aid portfolio. The second measure of a significant aid relationship is problematic because it does 
not specify what degree of coordination exists within the ‘90%’ donor group. According to the OECD 
definition, fragmentation does not always imply limited concentration of aid resources in given country 
contexts. As the OECD (OECD 2012a) notes, in numerous countries a small number of donors may ac-
count for a large aid share, leaving a ‘long tail’ of small contributions from various donors at the mar-
gins that complicates aid management.  
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the DAC, but also by the proliferation of channels for implementation among DAC donors 
and a growing reliance on earmarked contributions to multilateral organizations that have 
led to the creation of new implementing structures.10 To address problems of proliferation, 
the OECD encourages members to either increase their concentration of aid resources in 
particular country contexts or to exit countries where their aid relationships are not signifi-
cant (OECD 2012a).  
The coordination challenges that are emphasized in discussions on reducing donor frag-
mentation and improving the division of labour across and within partner countries gener-
ally consider inter-donor differences stemming from competing national interests and in-
centive structures to be key barriers to ensuring that the funding provided by diverse ac-
tors is more collectively effective (Williamson 2010). The challenge of inter-donor coor-
dination may be compounded by fragmentation in aid management within individual do-
nor systems, however. Bilateral donors are not always homogeneous development actors. 
At headquarters level, different governmental actors may not use consistent criteria for aid 
allocation. At the country level, investments overseen through alternative allocation chan-
nels from a single donor may not be closely coordinated. These deficits offer additional 
donor-specific reasons explaining why harmonization with other donors can be difficult to 
achieve. The dispersion of bureaucratic authority for development cooperation within bi-
lateral donor countries therefore carries the potential to undermine efforts to promote more 
effective aid delivery at the partner-country level.  
The proliferation of channels for cooperating with developing countries resulting from 
dispersed authority within donor countries or limited coordination among diverse donors 
are not only problematic because they can constrain the effectiveness of development co-
operation at the country level but also because they represent inefficiencies that carry a 
monetary cost for donor governments (Bigsten / Tengstam 2012). The analysis of the issue 
of bureaucratic pluralism therefore directly relates to the question of how donors can or-
ganize development cooperation to maximize the value of development assistance both to 
domestic taxpayers and partner-country populations.  
2.2 Bureaucratic pluralism and development effectiveness 
Donor contributions to global development goals extend beyond their role in providing 
support to partner countries through development cooperation programmes. One important 
area where donors can contribute to creating better framework conditions for development 
                                                            
10 Fragmentation in the provision of multilateral aid can be traced in part to the role of diverse donor 
bureaucracies as stakeholders in multilateral institutions. In the UN development system, for exam-
ple, efforts to promote greater system-wide coherence are hampered not only by the internal govern-
ance of the UN system or the diversity of the member state interests that influence decision-making, 
but also by the variations in the actors within UN member states represented in the governance struc-
tures of the 36 agencies that are members of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) 
(Weinlich 2011). In oversight boards of different UN agencies, member states are not necessarily 
represented with the same voice: agriculture ministries may participate in providing policy guidance 
and oversight of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), while health ministries play the 
same role with respect to the World Health Organization (WHO). If UN agencies face inconsistent 
demands originating from within single member states, it should not be surprising that incoherent ac-
tion across the UN system might result.  
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is by adapting policies in a variety of arenas with implications for developing countries. 
The recognition of the importance of non-aid policies in promoting development has 
encouraged the more widespread use of the term ‘development effectiveness’ as an ex-
tension of aid effectiveness as a policy goal. Development effectiveness can be under-
stood in different ways, including as a relabeling of the aid effectiveness agenda or as a 
concept that draws attention to various factors in addition to aid that can influence the 
achievement of development goals at the partner-country level (Kindornay 2011). One 
common connotation reflects the policy coherence for development agenda, emphasizing 
that governmental efforts to ensure greater consistency in the objectives of externally-
oriented policy fields with development objectives and to improve the extent of cross-
governmental policy coordination in areas such as trade, investment, migration, or envi-
ronmental protection can generate significant development benefits (OECD 2008d).  
The issue of policy coherence for development highlights key characteristics of donor 
foreign relations that are important in contextualizing the role of development coopera-
tion alongside other externally-oriented policies managed by diverse governmental ac-
tors. First, it underlines that the foreign policy interests of individual donors can be het-
erogeneous. Because policy choices in different domains reflect an aggregation of di-
verse national interests and influences from international sources, they are not necessari-
ly always consistent. The constituencies whose interests are represented in national trade 
or investment policies are not identical to the constituencies that actively seek to influ-
ence development policy choices, and the participation of specific governmental actors 
in policy formulation and implementation also varies across issue areas. Second, the 
discussion on policy coherence for development draws attention to the marginal charac-
ter of the ODA-centric policy community in comparison to communities engaged in oth-
er policy fields. In promoting policy coherence for development, the aid policy commu-
nity assumes an advocacy role in relation to policy communities whose domestic con-
stituencies are more powerful.  
The policy coherence for development agenda outlines multiple steps for donors to take 
in order to ensure that their foreign relations broadly support development goals. These 
steps include promoting greater consistency in the objectives that donors pursue and 
establishing cross-governmental mechanisms to foster policy coordination among gov-
ernmental actors with different foreign policy mandates (OECD 2009b). As a spectrum 
of bureaucratic actors within donor countries expand their international engagement, the 
coherence of their action can be analysed from two perspectives. The first perspective 
relates to the consistency of international funding for development — the extent to 
which processes of strategy development, financing, and implementation are guided by 
common principles and do not undermine development goals. A second dimension re-
lates to the extent to which policies and investments in different fields actively reinforce 
development goals (Keijzer / Oppewal 2012). This second dimension underlines that the 
expanding international mandate of sector-specific ministries is relevant beyond the is-
sue of how to improve the management of development cooperation because it reflects 
the need for donors to adopt a comprehensive foreign policy strategy that elevates the 
pursuit of development objectives by more effectively bringing together the contribu-
tions of a range of policy fields and governmental actors.  
The perspective adopted by proponents of greater policy coherence for development 
stresses the primacy of addressing development challenges as a foreign policy goal. The 
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orientation of this agenda is to suggest a transfer of development goals and principles to 
all public policy areas with a global dimension. However, to promote outcomes such as 
achieving consistency in purpose in external action and developing mutually reinforcing 
policies, a perspective on cooperation focusing on the reconciliation of objectives pro-
moted by different governmental actors may be better adapted to a reality in which poli-
cy areas outside of development policy hold greater weight in domestic political systems 
and in terms of their potential contribution to changing the framework conditions that 
enable development.  
As suggested above, the basic idea that donor contributions to development extend be-
yond financial transfers for development programmes administered through bilateral and 
multilateral agencies is widely accepted. Decisions taken in policy fields such as trade or 
investment policy have important material consequences for many developing countries. 
The multifaceted character of donor engagement with developing countries implies that 
the use of ODA as a benchmark for assessing contributions to development goals cap-
tures only one dimension of global engagement. Recognizing this limitation, the Center 
for Global Development’s Commitment to Development Index offers an alternative 
benchmark. By assessing the development friendliness of aid, migration, trade, envi-
ronment, security, technology, and investment policies together, the Index underlines the 
value of adopting a more comprehensive understanding of development policy that con-
textualizes the importance of ODA contributions alongside other policy emphases that 
may ultimately have a greater impact on economic development and poverty reduction 
prospects (Barder et al. 2012).  
The term ‘beyond aid’ has many connotations, but is often used in a spirit consistent 
with the Commitment to Development Index to emphasize that the effective response to 
global development challenges depends on both funding and policy changes across a 
range of externally-oriented policy fields.11 Although development cooperation has long 
served a variety of objectives, the expansion of the rationale of the policy field beyond a 
narrowly defined agenda that has recently focused on social development is becoming 
more apparent (Chandy 2011). The diversification of the actor landscape at the donor 
level in managing development cooperation follows from the expansion of this agenda. 
The contribution of sector-specific ministries to country-level cooperation programmes 
draws attention to the question of the consistency of development cooperation with 
broader regulatory policies influencing development outcomes, as the same governmen-
tal actors assume responsibility for shaping the policies that influence development 
framework conditions and for developing concrete initiatives addressing development 
goals within specific country contexts.  
 
 
                                                            
11 ‘Beyond aid’ can be shorthand for any of the following phenomena: the changing purposes of devel-
opment aid, the increasing development financing from sources beyond the public resources from 
OECD-DAC donor countries, the use of innovative financing instruments to address global develop-
ment goals, the process through which partner countries reduce aid dependency and donors prepare an 
aid exit, or the promotion of policy coherence for development. 
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3 Line ministries and the transformation of bilateral cooperation12 
The examination of the distribution of bureaucratic responsibilities for aid management 
within OECD-DAC donor countries at present is not only important because it draws at-
tention to how development cooperation can be made more effective, but also because this 
subject raises more fundamental questions about the scope, independence, and future of 
ODA as a policy field. This section explores the linkages between bureaucratic pluralism 
and the transformation of development cooperation.  
3.1 The changing issue agenda for development cooperation 
The distribution of bureaucratic responsibilities in development cooperation outlined 
above is defined with reference to bureaucratic involvement in overseeing the disburse-
ment of official development assistance (ODA). Although donors have some discretion in 
deciding how restrictively they apply the definition of the resource flows falling under the 
ODA label, ODA broadly covers concessional financial transfers to developing countries 
from public sources aiming to promote economic and social development (OECD 2008c). 
In practice, the definition used to chart donor development assistance spending patterns 
can encompass a range of official spending which does not necessarily involve a financial 
transfer to developing countries. Examples are funding related to the cost of housing refu-
gees in OECD-DAC countries and scholarship costs for students from developing coun-
tries studying at universities in OECD-DAC countries. These accounting practices have 
been regularly criticized by civil society organizations (VENRO 2013). At the same time, 
the classical ODA definition does not include some forms of external financing that can be 
considered to make a development contribution. Examples include funding for military 
operations that potentially contribute to stabilization efforts in fragile states or funding for 
environmental initiatives (Vanheukelom et al. 2012). A further limitation in the existing 
ODA definition is that the concessional character may exclude innovative forms of devel-
opment finance that seek to leverage public resources by mobilizing private funds for de-
velopment purposes.13 
These limitations of the classical ODA definition have led to proposals to re-conceive how 
national contributions to global development goals are reported and assessed. As one no-
table example, Severino and Ray (2009) have promoted the idea of replacing ODA as a 
benchmark with a broader concept of global policy finance, comprising funding from pub-
lic and private actors designed to support economic convergence, investments in basic 
human welfare, and financing for global public goods. As Kaul (2013) suggests, the provi-
sion of global public goods such as a stable global climate is consistent with a country-
                                                            
12 Although bilateral development cooperation programmes provide the frame of reference in this paper, the 
general issues it raises can also be extended to multilateral settings where a diversity of mandates under 
an organisation’s umbrella open the question of how to effectively manage external action in the future. 
As an example, the European Union continues to face challenges in institutionalizing the European Exter-
nal Action Service (EEAS) to support a comprehensive foreign policy approach (Smith 2013).  
13 The level of concessionality of ODA-eligible loans has been an additional subject of controversy in ODA 
reporting, given that donors vary in terms of the grant element that their concessional loans include. The 
provision of loans with a low grant element allows some donors to inflate their ODA budgets and can dis-
tort the picture of the overall level of financial transfers to developing countries (Tew 2013). 
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focused development cooperation agenda given that investments in developing country 
capacities are necessary to ensure that these countries are able to contribute to global pub-
lic goods provision. In line with Kaul’s argumentation, the justification for investing in 
development cooperation could increase with an emphasis on global public goods, as the 
concept stresses international interdependence and the negative consequences of low gov-
ernmental capacities to promote peace and security or environmental protection. While 
global public goods financing has already been included in ODA flows given donor sup-
port to address problems in partner countries with cross-border spillover effects (Reisen / 
Soto / Weithöner 2004), it nevertheless creates a possible trade-off with funding that is 
directed toward country-specific development objectives. The goal of supporting poverty 
reduction and promoting economic development in a given country context may overlap 
with the goal of increasing the capacity of states to contribute to global public goods pro-
vision, but promoting global public goods provision through development cooperation 
also implies shifts in the rationale of cooperation that could lead to changes in the alloca-
tion of resources to specific countries, sectors, and beneficiaries.  
Calls for donors to increasingly prioritize financing for global public goods indicate that 
the issue complexes that development-oriented funding is expected to respond to are 
changing. One key illustration concerns the linkage between the global response to climate 
change and the ODA policy field. International climate negotiations have acknowledged a 
need to substantially increase the availability of financial resources to developing coun-
tries in order to facilitate low-carbon development and enable climate adaptation. Funding 
to support climate-friendly development and cushion vulnerable populations from the ad-
verse consequences of climate change often has a purpose similar to ODA, and increasing 
the volume of ODA funding to address mitigation and adaptation challenges is considered 
one pathway to make progress in addressing climate goals (World Bank 2010). Neverthe-
less, the severity of the climate challenge suggests that resource mobilization through ex-
isting development assistance channels alone will be inadequate to grapple with this prob-
lem. International climate negotiations have therefore underlined the need to promote the 
principle of additionality of climate finance, even if numerous interpretations of the con-
cept of additionality persist (Brown / Bird / Schalatek 2010).  
As the notion of additionality implies, addressing climate financing needs will depend 
on contributions from a variety of public and private actors that are not necessarily part 
of the ODA policy system. Commitments to increase climate-related financing for de-
velopment have emerged from international conferences where environmental ministries 
have played a leading role, even though development agencies have played a key role in 
the implementation of adaptation finance in particular (Pickering / Skovgaard / Kim 
2013). On one level, rising interest in climate finance reflects an adjustment in priorities 
that can either supplement or compete with existing development cooperation pro-
grammes. While the promotion of climate stability and development can be considered 
mutually reinforcing goals, in a context where resources to invest in cooperation are lim-
ited, the climate agenda could for example lead to a reallocation of resources toward 
countries where mitigation gains are considered to be essential or to a shift within coop-
eration portfolios to support adaptation measures in specific country contexts. Whether a 
reprioritization within cooperation programmes linked to the climate agenda will also 
lead to the creation of new channels and instruments for cooperation that introduce co-
ordination challenges remains an open question.  
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On another level, the growing importance of climate change as an issue complex impact-
ing prospects for development creates new challenges with respect to mobilizing expertise 
to manage interlinked policy fields (e.g. energy and climate protection; climate adaptation 
and development).14 While the expertise available in many development agencies encom-
passes a variety of sectors, this existing expertise may be insufficient in addressing the 
various dimensions of the climate challenge, including questions concerning technology 
transfer, efficient energy production and use, infrastructure development, and sustainable 
land use management. The climate policy field is only one of several areas where the over-
laps between development policy and other areas of specialized expertise are becoming 
more apparent (Faust / Messner 2012). Other examples include the response to state fragil-
ity, which requires drawing expertise from the security and law enforcement sectors and 
the field of global health, where the threat of global pandemics underlines the interde-
pendence of domestic and international policy fields. The demands on governments to 
combine expertise from different areas in order to address interlinked challenges raises 
questions about how well foreign affairs and development bureaucracies are able to fulfil 
the role of knowledge managers bridging sectoral divides while reconciling national inter-
ests with the interests of partner countries.  
3.2 The changing country contexts where development cooperation takes place 
It is not only the diversification of the priorities of cooperation between OECD and non-
OECD countries and the importance of policies beyond the scope of classical ODA that 
are challenging the traditional boundaries of development cooperation as a policy field, 
but also the changing national contexts in which development support is delivered. The 
role that shifts in economic wealth and poverty around the globe play in contributing to 
a reassessment of development cooperation has been noted by many observers. The dis-
tinction between developed and developing countries is blurring with the rising econom-
ic fortunes of many non-OECD countries, while the heterogeneity of development path-
ways among non-OECD countries is also perceptible (Harris / Moore / Schmitz 2009; 
Koch 2012). The diversity of development pathways among ODA recipients means that 
the complex of interests driving the foreign policy choices of OECD countries toward 
non-OECD countries is not uniform: donors adopt a variety of policy mixes in engaging 
with non-OECD countries. 
For some low-income countries, ODA continues to represent an important source of de-
velopment funding. According to World Bank data, ODA receipts accounted for more 
than 10 per cent of Gross National Income in 36 states in 2010, with fragile states and 
small island developing states well-represented on this list (World Bank 2013). For 
many others, the economic importance of ODA is limited in relation to other forms of 
resource mobilization. ActionAid has noted that levels of aid dependency measured in 
terms of aid provided as a share of central government expenditure have been declining 
                                                            
14 This discussion parallels analysis in the field of environmental governance underlining that advances in 
policy fields at the core of national economies that address the causes of environmental problems are 
critical in promoting sustainable development. Making progress in this area is dependent not only on 
the overall public policy goals that governments accept but also on the coordination structures that are 
created to manage the engagement of a variety of players whose actions influence the success of the 
sustainable development agenda (Jänicke / Jörgens 2006).  
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over the last decade even as aid flows have increased (ActionAid 2011). While ODA can 
continue to play a role in stimulating economic growth and improving the conditions for 
mobilizing other development resources, its relative weight in the development funding 
landscape is diminishing.15 
Fragile states represent one end of the spectrum in considering how the country contexts 
where ODA is disbursed are changing. Fragile states are generally characterized as 
countries where governmental institutions have limited capacities to ensure the control 
of their territories and to provide an adequate level of services to their populations. The 
need for coordination both across the donor community and within individual donor 
countries is considered to be especially important in these contexts given the limitations 
in partner-country capacities to manage diverse actors and the contribution of collective 
action in supporting stabilization efforts (OPM/IDL 2008). Because such states have 
often endured conflict and poverty rates are high, donor responses to addressing chal-
lenges in fragile state contexts must have a multidimensional quality that implies a role 
for a variety of governmental actors in designing and executing policy. To re-establish 
order in a post-conflict context, resources from diplomatic, military, and development 
actors need to be brought together to pursue short-term stabilization goals while ena-
bling long-term reconstruction efforts.  
The need for effective coordination among governmental actors within individual donor 
governments has been summarized under the label of ‘whole of government’ approach-
es, defined simply as the pursuit of a coherent programme of action across the full spec-
trum of government departments engaging in particular country contexts. Although the 
rationale for adopting a whole of government approach is clear, achieving coherent 
cross-governmental action in practice is often difficult for a variety of reasons. Defence, 
foreign affairs, development, and other bureaucracies may differ in terms of how they 
interpret the nature of the problem that engagement is supposed to address and thus 
promote alternative priorities for engagement. In addition to these basic goal conflicts, 
achieving more consolidated action can be hindered by a lack of overarching political 
guidance for engagement and by bureaucratic incentives to limit staff investments in 
time-consuming consultations with other bureaucracies (OECD 2006). Possible reme-
dies for shortcomings in responding to challenges in fragile states therefore include de-
veloping country strategies to place the action of individual donors under a common 
framework and linking personnel investments in cross-governmental coordination to 
career advancement opportunities (Patrick / Brown 2007).16  
                                                            
15 A large number of countries continue to qualify as ODA recipients even as their levels of economic 
development and capacities for mobilizing resources through alternative channels have increased. One 
hundred and forty-eight countries and territories appear on the DAC’s most recent list of ODA recipi-
ents. There are 54 Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories on this list, including numerous 
countries (e.g. Brazil, China, South Africa, and Turkey) which provide development funding to other 
countries (OECD 2012c).  
16 These considerations are not unique to the development policy arena, but reflect general dilemmas 
related to cooperation among government bureaucracies. In his classical treatment of bureaucracies in 
the American political system, James Q. Wilson (1989) notes that the desire of bureaucracies to main-
tain autonomy (‘to protect turf’) leads to competition with other governmental actors to avoid intrusion 
on a bureaucracy’s core tasks. Coordination with other bureaucracies may not be considered necessary 
to fulfil an agency’s core objectives, and the participation of individual civil servants in coordination 
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At the other end of the spectrum in country contexts where governments are capable of 
mobilizing increasing domestic resources for development and the importance of ODA 
as a share of GDP is diminishing, donors face a challenge of transforming bilateral rela-
tionships, phasing out development assistance while potentially introducing other coop-
eration instruments that reflect a changing rationale for engagement that is more trans-
parently interest-based. In a rare study on processes of aid exit and transformation, Slob 
and Jerve (2008) assess the experiences of four small-state donors (Denmark, the Neth-
erlands, Norway, and Sweden) in implementing decisions to phase out ODA pro-
grammes in various country contexts, including in situations where graduation from de-
velopment assistance due to gains in economic and political development in the partner 
country is a primary motive.17  
The factors that make countries candidates for a graduation from development assistance 
also make these countries attractive as continuing bilateral partners for donor govern-
ments, underlining that phasing out ODA is not necessarily equivalent to reducing the 
level of political or economic engagement with a given country. In regional powers in 
particular, phasing out aid may in fact coincide with an increase in the priority attached 
to the bilateral relationship. The transition to new cooperation arrangements can involve 
a number of considerations for donor countries, including assessing which previous 
structures and instruments of cooperation can be usefully carried over to new bilateral 
cooperation programmes, how mutual interests in the bilateral relationship can be effec-
tively promoted, and how lessons on effective development practice can be transferred 
to new fields of cooperation. According to Slob and Jerve (2008), while donors have 
expressed the goal of transforming bilateral cooperation in contexts of aid graduation, it 
is nevertheless often unclear what the nature of the transformation is. New forms of bi-
lateral cooperation may actually be very similar in nature to the ODA that they displace. 
Yet the transition can also entail new funding sources from within a donor country or an 
adjustment of the weight of certain instruments in the donor’s aid portfolio, creating 
pressures for organizational reform within country-level missions to manage the shifting 
actor landscape on the donor side.  
These examples from country contexts at opposite ends of the spectrum — fragile states 
dependent on external support for stabilization at one end and well-performing states in 
which the significance of ODA as a source of financing and knowledge transfer is de-
clining at the other — underscore that the analysis of the role of various governmental 
actors in bilateral cooperation must consider the variety of problem complexes that do-
nors currently need to adapt aid management systems to. Although the issues of cross-
governmental consistency and coordination arise in many different contexts, because 
actor constellations differ across problem complexes the future role of development 
agencies and foreign affairs ministries in these areas may also vary. In identifying the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
processes may not be considered ‘career-enhancing.’ The desire to preserve bureaucratic autonomy fo-
cused around the fulfilment of a core mission is not only relevant in understanding bureaucratic compe-
tition, but also in considering processes of bureaucratic consolidation, as the absorption of additional 
competencies that lie outside traditional spheres of activity may be resisted by agencies that perceive an 
expanded agenda as a way of diluting their core mandate (Halperin / Clapp / Kanter 2006).  
17 ODA phase-outs may also take place due to changes in the political situation in partner countries or due 
to political changes within donor countries that may for example result in a concentration of ODA re-
sources in particular countries. The concentration of ODA may also follow from division of labour ex-
ercises designed to reduce the number of donors active in a particular country context.  
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contribution of diverse line ministries to bilateral cooperation, it is therefore useful to 
consider what specific competencies ministries bring in crafting responses to different 
types of development challenges.  
3.3 Mobilizing sector-specific knowledge and new partnerships for development 
The shifting issue agenda in development cooperation and the diversification of the 
character of country contexts in which bilateral cooperation programmes are implement-
ed contribute to the growing heterogeneity of global development actors. The multiplica-
tion of actors in this field can be viewed positively, given their potential to provide addi-
tional financial resources or other forms of support and contribute policy ideas that offer 
partner countries a wider range of alternatives in considering how to foster their own 
development (Davies 2011; Zimmermann / Smith 2011). State development assistance 
providers beyond the DAC, private-aid providers, and recently created funding vehicles 
dedicated to narrow themes such as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization 
(GAVI) are frequently cited as illustrations of the general trend toward actor prolifera-
tion in development. Although the higher visibility of a variety of development actors 
can be considered beneficial in terms of mobilizing resources and expanding choice 
among development partners, actor proliferation is also perceived to be taking place in a 
context where the institutions for managing cooperation among actors are either prolif-
erating themselves (Davies 2011) or failing to adapt to new realities (Severino / Ray 
2010).  
The 4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011 emphasized the wel-
come contribution that a variety of public and private actors could make to advancing 
development goals and acknowledged that future efforts to promote international coop-
eration must have a more inclusive character than processes driven by the OECD’s De-
velopment Assistance Committee. The underlying logic of the Global Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation that emerged from the High-Level Forum is that 
while participating actors may share general development objectives, they vary not only 
in their capacities to contribute to a common agenda but also in the nature of the 
strengths that they bring to the partnership. For this reason, the Global Partnership em-
phasizes the need to acknowledge the distinct roles that diverse actors are able to play 
and the importance of designing cooperation with the notion of exploiting comparative 
advantages clearly in mind (4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 2011).  
This basic objective of the Global Partnership – managing diversity by recognizing the 
complementary strengths of different actors – is a general objective underlying many 
types of partnerships. The Global Development Alliance conceived by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) in 2001 as an innovative vehicle to 
increase private resource mobilization for development provides an illustration of the 
partnership logic. The Global Development Alliance lists numerous resources that dif-
ferent types of actors can contribute to development initiatives. These resources include 
funding, specialized expertise, technological or intellectual property assets, business 
practices, an ability to influence policy, or access to new networks (USAID 2006).  
This list of resources can be extended beyond the context of public-private partnerships 
to assess the potential for complementary engagement from many different types of ac-
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tors, including governmental actors within the DAC. Three potential strengths of line 
ministries beyond development agencies can be highlighted in this context.18 The first 
relates to their expertise. Expertise has commonly been considered a primary source of 
bureaucratic policy influence (Bendor / Taylor / van Gaalen 1985; Wilson 1989). Be-
cause of the focused character of their work within specific policy fields, bureaucracies 
generally have an informational advantage over governmental actors such as legislators, 
whose broad role in budgeting and policymaking limits specialization. Sector-specific 
bureaucracies may also have knowledge advantages in particular thematic areas in com-
parison to development bureaucracies, where available competencies cover a spectrum 
of sectors and where generalists may oversee the implementation of programmes and 
projects combining interventions across sectors.  
The diverse thematic portfolios that development agencies manage may also be consid-
ered a source of specialized expertise, and an understanding of the interrelationship be-
tween dimensions of development including economic production, governance, social 
development, and environmental protection can be an asset in defining appropriate re-
sponses to development challenges in partner countries. Expertise can also relate to 
knowledge of specific countries or regions. Such expertise can be expected to be in 
greater supply in ministries with a larger presence in developing country contexts or 
larger personnel investments in geographical bureaus. One useful way of distinguishing 
development policy from other dimensions of external action is that the policy field pur-
sues the goal of shaping the internal conditions of partner countries (Kloke-Lesch 1998). 
The locus of engagement is an important defining feature of development cooperation 
and the understanding of dynamics of change within varied country contexts should be 
an advantage that development bureaucracies possess in relation to other governmental 
actors.  
A second potential strength concerns the differences in business practices that organiza-
tions adopt that can be a source of innovation in international cooperation. Examples of 
business practices that may be relevant in an international context include processes for 
managing procurement, reporting standards for implementing partners, and monitoring 
and evaluation practice to assess results. Business practices can influence how partner 
countries judge the value of cooperation programmes and the effectiveness of coopera-
tion instruments. As an example, the practice of tying aid to procurement contracts with 
donor firms has limited the flexibility of partner countries to manage aid resources and 
reduced the overall value of aid transferred. Although aid tying has diminished over time 
within the OECD-DAC community, variations across the donor community and among 
agencies within individual donors persist, in part because of the association of tying with 
particular forms of assistance including infrastructure loans or food aid (Clay et al. 
2008). Reporting standards can similarly restrict flexibility in how partner countries can 
make use of support and affect the nature of the administrative burden they carry. In 
assessing how three partner countries are managing a changing development finance 
landscape, Greenhill et al. (Greenhill / Prizzon / Rogerson 2013) note that stakeholders 
valued the speed of financing delivered by non-traditional development actors, a factor 
                                                            
18 These potential strengths of organizations mentioned in a partnership development context overlap 
with commonly listed sources of bureaucratic influence in policy processes. Policy expertise, leader-
ship and managerial effectiveness, the motivation of personnel, organisational cohesiveness, and sup-
port from external constituencies are highlighted in that context (Nicholson-Crotty / Miller 2012).  
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linked to the procedures that guide aid delivery. Finally, monitoring and evaluation prac-
tice reflects organizational efforts to assess how well they are achieving goals they have 
set and to learn from their experiences in order to improve implementation in the future.  
A final possible contribution of bureaucratic pluralism relates to the embeddedness of 
sector-specific ministries in networks beyond the development policy community.19 The 
engagement of bureaucracies with varied constituencies can be both a source of the in-
terests that executive agencies defend and a source of power, as external support for an 
agency’s work can strengthen its position in budgetary or policy processes (Wilson 
1989). At the same time, networks including external constituencies can be a source for 
generating ideas about solutions to policy challenges or present opportunities for ex-
panding development partnerships. The linkage of ministries to particular domestic con-
stituencies can potentially expand the community of actors engaging on global issues 
and mobilize expertise from private sector entities or research communities that has not 
yet been fully tapped in development cooperation. Within partner countries, sector-
specific ministries may also have the capacity to open access to actors such as counter-
parts in line ministries or multinational corporations operating in a specific sector.  
This discussion of the potential strengths that different bureaucracies can bring to the 
policy processes addressing development issues does not imply a pre-existing judgment 
on the value or effectiveness of particular organizations in contributing to global devel-
opment goals. Each of the potential strengths listed above carries a possible downside. 
Deep expertise within a specific field may limit bureaucratic players from acknowledg-
ing interdependencies across policy fields and compromising with other governmental 
actors to reach decisions that reflect the trade-offs between alternative priorities. Man-
agement structures and business practices within sector-specific ministries may not be 
more effective or efficient than the operating procedures of development ministries. The 
enlargement of networks of actors engaging on development issues may also expand the 
diversity of interests that are represented within international cooperation programmes, 
leading to a confusion of goals and questions about who the beneficiaries of these pro-
grammes are.  
In sum, as the problem complexes and country contexts that development policy pro-
vides a response to shift, the palette of actors able to make a useful contribution to ad-
dressing development challenges may also change. Analysing the assets that different 
organizations possess therefore represents a valuable step in considering how diverse 
resources and capabilities can be effectively brought together in the future.  
 
 
                                                            
19 Key constituencies within the development policy community include the non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) that conduct advocacy on development issues and implement projects in developing 
countries on their own behalf and as partners of other aid providers, for-profit contractors that imple-
ment development projects, public implementing agencies, and research organizations that focus on 
global development issues.  
Erik Lundsgaarde 
20  German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
4 Bureaucratic pluralism in international cooperation: a research agenda  
The foregoing sections have outlined numerous issues that the global engagement of a 
variety of sector-specific ministries may present for the practice of development coopera-
tion and the transformation of bilateral relations between donors and partner countries in 
more general terms. The paper has identified both potential positive contributions of bu-
reaucracies through the mobilization of additional resources and expertise and possible 
negative consequences of their expanding role such as goal conflicts and coordination 
challenges as outgrowths of the engagement of sector-specific ministries in global devel-
opment. To reach conclusions on what adjustments to donor action might be useful in light 
of the current bureaucratic landscape, it is necessary to move beyond this discussion of the 
potential role of various bureaucracies to examine their actual role. This section highlights 
key elements of a research agenda that can contribute to placing the discussion of bureau-
cratic pluralism in global development on a sounder empirical footing.  
4.1 Descriptive assessment of the global role of bureaucracies 
The analytical framework used in the DAC peer review process of the development coop-
eration programmes of individual donors offers a relevant reference point in examining 
the development role of sector-specific ministries. DAC peer reviews generally assess the 
overall strategic vision guiding donor ODA programmes, trends in the overall volume and 
geographical allocation of aid, the organizational set-up of aid, preferred aid implementa-
tion channels, and business practices within donor systems (OECD 2013a).  
Although DAC peer reviews signal that domestically-oriented government departments 
have increased their global role across many donor contexts, there is little systematized 
evidence on trends in funding to sector-specific ministries over time. The depiction of 
trends through time can add to a picture of the current distribution of funding across min-
istries by indicating whether a noticeable change in the funding landscape is actually oc-
curring and what the pace of this change appears to be. Collecting data on the scale of co-
operation programmes in developing countries overseen by different ministries is a basic 
starting point for assessing the implications of their engagement on the transformation of 
development cooperation. While some of this will fall under an ODA label, international 
funding of sector-specific ministries may not be restricted to resources that qualify as 
ODA. Examples can include support related to military engagement in particular contexts, 
loans with a low level of concessionality, or cultural promotion programmes (OECD 
2008c). Because non-ODA resources may also generate goal conflicts and coordination 
challenges in bilateral cooperation, it is useful to adopt an expansive view of funding to 
analyse the problems and opportunities that might arise from bureaucratic pluralism. 
Beyond establishing the scale of the challenge that bureaucratic pluralism presents for 
development cooperation, a closer examination of funding trends should also highlight the 
priorities in international engagement from sector-specific ministries. To some degree, the 
broad priorities of these ministries should derive from their domestic mandates. By analys-
ing the geographical allocation of funding from sector-specific ministries and what the-
matic issues are privileged, the potential for issue overlap and coordination challenges 
with other bureaucracies should become more apparent.  
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A final aspect of a descriptive overview of bureaucracies as global development actors 
relates to the way that they engage in international cooperation. On one level, this con-
cerns the form of engagement, for example what the weight of technical or financial coop-
eration or shorter-term funding such as humanitarian assistance in their overall interna-
tional portfolio is. On another level, this can refer to more specific channels of implemen-
tation that are favoured. Channels of implementation are linked to the nature of partners 
that ministries prefer to engage with. These may include other donor bureaucracies which 
serve as implementing partners, governmental actors in partner countries, or private actors 
at donor or partner-country levels. The selection of partners may also reflect the extent to 
which bilateral cooperation undertaken by sector-specific ministries is guided by aid effec-
tiveness principles promoting the use of country systems in aid implementation and coor-
dination with other aid providers. The assessment of preferred allocation channels across 
donor bureaucracies can reveal whether sector-specific ministries present any fundamental 
challenges to the development cooperation business models applied by development agen-
cies or whether their engagement provides examples of innovations in how bilateral coop-
eration can be organized. A core question is whether their engagement reinforces the de-
velopment cooperation programmes overseen by development agencies by promoting con-
sistent interests and making use of similar pathways for implementation. If this does not 
occur, sector-specific ministries could contribute to fragmentation in the development co-
operation landscape that could undermine the collective effectiveness of various forms of 
support provided by a single donor government.  
4.2 Sector-specific ministries within a bilateral international cooperation system 
While presenting an overview of the funding trends, priorities, and preferred implementa-
tion channels of sector-specific ministries in international cooperation can be valuable in 
its own right, to understand the contribution of these ministries to the transformation of 
bilateral relations and the challenges that they present for development cooperation it is 
necessary to contextualize their role within a multi-actor system within donor countries 
that influences their range of action. Sector-specific ministries do not freely determine 
funding levels for international cooperation or define their mandate for global engagement 
in an entirely independent manner. Rather, they are dependent on legislative and executive 
authorities to define their parameters for action.20 If issue overlaps or coordination deficits 
exist among ministries, this may reflect shortcomings in the character of cross-
governmental institutions for ensuring a consistency of purpose, efficiency in the alloca-
tion of resources, and the harmonization of bureaucratic practice. It follows that the analy-
sis of sector-specific ministries in international cooperation is incomplete without atten-
tion to the governmental mechanisms that establish policy guidance for international en-
gagement and manage potential conflicts of interest across bureaucracies.  
Governmental mechanisms to foster cooperation among ministries can have a hierarchical 
or horizontal character. Hierarchical coordination in global development can occur if the 
chief executive assumes responsibility for directing the activities of the spectrum of minis-
tries providing technical assistance or disbursing funding in developing countries. Hierar-
                                                            
20 It can be expected that the degree of executive autonomy will vary among other reasons depending on 
the relationship between legislatures and the executive within a given political system.  
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chical coordination can alternatively take place through the designation of a government 
focal point to promote strategic coherence in international cooperation, a function that 
foreign affairs ministries could assume due to their primacy in managing bilateral rela-
tions. The issue of hierarchical coordination in the development arena is directly related to 
the role assigned to a specialized development cooperation bureaucracy within the foreign 
affairs apparatus. As noted above, there are variations across the donor community in how 
the lines of responsibility between foreign affairs and development bureaucracies are 
drawn. While development cooperation is subordinated to foreign affairs in many donor 
contexts, in select cases development bureaucracies may have the power to steer govern-
ment policy toward developing countries and can play a coordinating role in relation to 
other ministries that engage in developing country contexts. The extent to which a devel-
opment bureaucracy fulfils a leadership role within the bilateral cooperation system should 
influence how diverse ministries pursue cooperation that is consistent with the interests 
and practices of development bureaucracies.  
The pursuit of consistent action among diverse actors in international cooperation does not 
necessarily depend on top-down coordination structures alone. Collaboration among gov-
ernment departments can also follow a horizontal logic. Horizontal collaboration can in-
clude joint planning or the joint implementation of specific programmes. As the discussion 
on joint-programming initiatives among donor governments suggests, joint planning can 
include a common analysis of the development challenges that funding should address and 
the determination of a strategy for the allocation of resources that avoids duplication and 
limits transaction costs for partner governments (Galeazzi / Helly / Krätke 2013). Horizon-
tal collaboration may also take the form of information sharing. Information sharing 
across government agencies is a form of knowledge management, a concept generally 
associated with internal learning processes within individual organizations (Hovland 2003; 
Krohwinkel-Karlsson 2007). Although organizations such as development agencies face 
challenges in assessing the effectiveness of their own work and ensuring that best practice 
is diffused within the organization, the role of sector-specific ministries as global actors 
raises questions about how knowledge on effective development practice is transferred 
across ministerial lines. In the same vein, if the expertise that sector-specific ministries 
possess is considered a source of fresh approaches to dealing with global challenges, the 
channels for two-way knowledge transfer between development agencies and other bu-
reaucratic players should also be examined in more detail.  
In short, to assess the nature of the challenges that the distribution of responsibilities for 
international cooperation across a variety of ministries presents for donor governments, 
the character and functionality of mechanisms for cross-governmental coordination related 
to international cooperation requires further analysis. A key aspect of this kind of analysis 
is assessing the role played by foreign affairs and development bureaucracies in influenc-
ing the way that sector-specific ministries provide support in developing country contexts.  
4.3 Country-level concerns 
The general issues outlined above relating to the assessment of the profile of cooperation 
programmes overseen by sector-specific ministries and their relationship to other actors 
within a system of international cooperation also provide guidance for research at the 
partner-country level on the transformation of development cooperation. As Section 3 un-
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derlined, the profile of development cooperation depends on the characteristics of the 
country contexts where various forms of support (technical, financial, or humanitarian 
assistance) are provided. In fragile states, for example, the role of security-oriented actors 
such as defence and law enforcement agencies can be expected to be more important. In 
partner countries experiencing an economic transition which are becoming ever less de-
pendent on external funding in the form of official development assistance, governmental 
actors whose mandate focuses on the promotion of commercial interests can be expected 
to assume a more important role. In fragile contexts, the long-term survival of develop-
ment assistance in a traditional form may be imaginable, while in transition economies 
development agencies might need to consider how to transfer their lessons learned to the 
governmental actors who will displace them in the future. The differences in key problem 
complexes across diverse country contexts can thus influence how the role of development 
agencies is defined in relation to other governmental actors engaging globally. 
Across diverse country contexts, the exploration of bureaucratic pluralism can neverthe-
less be guided by common questions derived from the discussion of the portrait of bureau-
cratic engagement and the character of cross-governmental coordinating mechanisms 
above. In a first step, country-level research should establish a descriptive foundation by 
outlining the magnitude of resources managed by various bureaucracies, the thematic are-
as to which these resources are directed, and the channels for implementation that gov-
ernmental actors prefer. As with descriptive analysis at a broader level, the purpose of 
raising these questions is to identify emerging priority areas in bilateral cooperation, to 
highlight potential for areas of overlap or goal conflicts among ministries, and to assess 
coordination needs within the cooperation system.  
A second issue for country-level research concerns the way that the coherence of cross-
governmental action is promoted. One dimension of coherence is the existence and char-
acter of a strategy for cooperation with a given country that has incorporated input from 
the diverse ministries with country-level representation and provides guidance for all ac-
tors engaged in a specific country context. Country strategies should provide a tool for 
aligning donor contributions with the development priorities of the partner government 
and a basis for identifying complementary areas of investment with other donors in addi-
tion to offering guidance on how to effectively bring together contributions from govern-
mental entities from a single donor government. A unified strategy for engagement should 
make clear what the priorities for bilateral engagement are and how the efforts of different 
governmental actors are designed to complement one another in addressing key goals. 
The examination of the role of embassies in managing the engagement of diverse bureau-
cracies is an extension of the analysis of the strategic coherence of governmental action. 
Over time, the OECD-DAC community has encouraged decentralization of development 
cooperation decision-making to country-level missions in order to improve the respon-
siveness of aid initiatives to local challenges (OECD 2008a). Although diplomatic repre-
sentations could be expected to be a focal point for all ministries engaging in international 
cooperation in a given country context, in practice externally-oriented ministries may act 
primarily in accordance with the objectives of their headquarters, and funding priorities, 
implementation channels, and disbursement practices may thus vary across bureaucracies. 
If varied donor bureaucracies operate in a relatively autonomous manner at the country-
level, this may reinforce challenges related to fragmentation in aid management within 
partner-country governments. In partner-country contexts where line ministries assume 
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greater responsibility in negotiating with the various donors wishing to provide funding to 
specific sectors, the overall leverage of the central government vis-à-vis aid providers may 
diminish (Whitfield 2009). While the engagement of donor sector-specific ministries with 
counterparts in partner countries might carry advantages in enabling knowledge transfer, 
the diffusion of engagement could also undermine coherence within partner-country gov-
ernments in implementing national development programmes. The extent of intra-
governmental coordination through an embassy may therefore not only have consequences 
for the consistency of donor action and the capacity of a single donor to coordinate with 
other external actors, but for the ability of donor governments to effectively support part-
ner-country efforts to manage development processes. 
Coordination with other actors is only one aspect of enhancing the effectiveness of devel-
opment cooperation programmes. In examining the country-level contributions of sector-
specific ministries to development, it is also relevant to analyse the management practices 
that govern how bureaucracies engage with partners and how they assess the achievements 
of their investments.  
5 Conclusions 
This paper has considered bureaucratic pluralism in development cooperation – the inter-
nationalization of the work of a diverse spectrum of ministries – to represent one manifes-
tation of the broader phenomenon of actor proliferation in global development, that is, one 
dimension of the transformation of ODA as a policy field. To inform the assessment of the 
scale and character of this transformation, the paper underlines the need to establish a 
stronger empirical foundation on the global engagement of ministries beyond the foreign 
affairs and development bureaucracies that continue to dominate the development cooper-
ation landscape. Empirical work on this topic can proceed on three levels: 1) mapping the 
state of development cooperation programmes funded by diverse ministries to assess the 
potential for issue overlap and goal conflicts among ministries; 2) identifying the organi-
zational structures in which external action is embedded to assess the capacity of govern-
mental institutions to manage pluralism; 3) assessing the character of bureaucratic en-
gagement and the consistency of support from individual donors at the country level. The 
examination of these aspects of ministerial engagement should contribute to discussions 
on how donors can effectively organize international cooperation in the future to reconcile 
the interests of diverse governmental actors with the interests of bilateral partners.  
The reference point for this paper is clearly the ODA policy field and the norms of aid and 
development effectiveness that are associated with it. On one level, the study of this topic 
is oriented toward understanding the reach of donor commitments to implementing the aid 
and development effectiveness agenda across the spectrum of governmental engagement 
in developing country contexts. However, the goal of this undertaking is not simply to 
assess the consistency of the approaches of ministries beyond development agencies with 
the aid and development effectiveness agenda, but also to identify the potential strengths 
of these actors and the issues that are relevant in defining the role of diverse ministries in 
development cooperation in the future. An underlying assumption of the analysis is that 
the diversification of the actor landscape in development cooperation can add value to 
efforts to respond to development challenges. Because these challenges remain vast in 
scope, there may not only be room for a variety of actors to contribute but also a need to 
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attract their political, financial, and knowledge resources to the development enterprise to 
a greater degree. Making use of these possible strengths and limiting the known disad-
vantages associated with donor fragmentation requires attention to how the development 
cooperation systems in which diverse contributions are embedded are organized and what 
practices enable the complementary deployment of these resources.  
As the discussion in the first chapter of this paper highlighted, the participation of sector-
specific ministries in development cooperation is not a new phenomenon. Still, the in-
volvement of diverse governmental entities in donor countries in guiding and implement-
ing cooperation programmes has received limited scrutiny. While the scale of their partic-
ipation in development cooperation may justify a focus on other potential sources of inef-
ficiency or ineffectiveness within donor systems, their engagement nevertheless raises 
fundamental questions about how to characterize the ODA policy field and how it is ad-
justing to changing country contexts and issue agendas. In particular, the linkage of bu-
reaucratic agendas with national interests in specific sectors highlights a transparent inter-
est orientation in donor engagement that implies a need to reflect on how cooperation pro-
grammes justified on the basis of mutual interests can also generate mutually beneficial 
outcomes.  
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